Powering the Planet [2007 MRS Spring Meeting Plenary Address] by Lewis, Nathan S.
808 MRS BULLETIN • VOLUME 32 • OCTOBER 2007 • www/mrs.org/bulletin
Powering the Planet
Nathan S. Lewis
The following article is an edited transcript based on the plenary presentation given
by Nathan S. Lewis (California Institute of Technology) on April 11, 2007, at the
Materials Research Society Spring Meeting in San Francisco.
I am humbled and honored to be here to
tell you about a topic that is dear to every-
one’s heart—and vital to the future of our
planet. My colleague, Richard Smalley,
gave a presentation1 on this topic several
years ago, at a similar MRS plenary ses-
sion. Over the last few years of Dr.
Smalley’s life, he and I worked together,
traveling across our country to deliver a
message about a subject that we—like
many others, both scientists and lay peo-
ple—have come to believe is unequivo-
cally the most important technological
problem in the world: our global energy
future. That is an incredibly powerful
statement, one that during the next hour I
hope to ably defend.
My presentation will offer a perspective
similar to Dr. Smalley’s, although through
a different lens. In this talk, I will not focus
on the science that my team is doing in the
laboratory. That will be left for the specific
venues where we, as scientists, talk about
science. Instead, I am going to talk about
the bigger picture of our energy challenge.
I believe that we researchers, the modern-
day spokespeople for this challenge, have
a responsibility to understand it and its
terms so that we can help communicate
why it is critically important, do some-
thing about it through our own research
efforts, and present our message effec-
tively to the general public. Compared
with all the other technical issues facing us
in the world today, why is energy the most
important? I believe that energy, not the
dollar, is the currency of the world. It is the
joule that drives every economy and gives
people a way out of poverty. Without
energy, we cannot find or administer med-
icine to cure disease, we cannot purify
water, we cannot drive our cars; we cannot
go to work, operate computers, or even
study at night. Because our modern lives
run on various forms of energy, we need to
find a way to manage our energy chal-
lenges before they begin to manage us.
To provide some balance to this talk, I
would like to state that I am not the only
one saying that energy is the most impor-
tant technological problem in the world.
Scientists are saying it, journalists are
 saying it, the pundits are saying it.
Dr. Smalley testified in Congress that
energy is indeed the most critical of current-
day issues. He stated that it “is the single
most important challenge facing humanity
today.”2 Chemical & Engineering News
described energy as “the single most
important scientific and technological
challenge facing humanity in the next cen-
tury.”3 Author and syndicated public
affairs columnist Thomas L. Friedman
believes that the need to achieve energy
independence in America is “blindingly
obvious.”4 Susan Hockfield, president of
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT), in her inaugural address, said that
“it is our responsibility to lead in [this]
mission” to deal with the energy problem.
As a country, we are not pursuing solu-
tions to our energy problems with any-
where near the same intensity that we are,
for example, leading in efforts to cure dis-
ease. It is up to researchers, therefore, to
help formulate and lead the initiative to
aggressively address our energy issues.
Otherwise, as many reports have unequiv-
ocally shown—including the report5 that
Richard Smalley and I contributed to and
the solar report from the U.S. Department
of Energy6 that I co-authored—it will sim-
ply be too little, too late. That is something
we simply cannot afford to have happen.
This presentation will comprise three
parts. The first part will focus on the scale
of our energy challenge, which is what
makes the problem truly severe and diffi-
cult. The second part will be a reasonable
scenario of what the future is likely to
bring, a description of the problem. The
third part will center on the possible solu-
tions to the problem.
Scaling the Problem
The problem of producing energy in a
sustainable way is such an enormous one
that we need to calibrate its scale. Looking
at powers of 1000, PDAs have a mean load
of about 1 W. Toasters are 1000 times more
energy-intensive, about 1 kW, which is, by
the way, about the average typical home
electricity demand. A thousand toasters
would consume about a megawatt, the
power required to run a small jet engine.
A thousand jet engines would consume a
gigawatt, which is about the electrical out-
put rate of a typically sized nuclear fission
power plant. Moving to a much grander
scale, consider a photo of the world at
night, from space, showing the millions of
pinpoints of light on Earth. A thousand
nuclear power plants would be required
to generate enough electricity to satisfy
global demand, which represents about
1 trillion watts, or 1 terawatt, of electricity.
That 1 trillion watts, however, is only a
fraction of the total thermal load of human
energy consumption on our planet. We
now actually use over 10 times more
energy than that to run the world. Taking
the number of joules of energy consumed
by humans in a typical year, and dividing
that by the number of seconds in a year,
yields an average burn rate of about
13 trillion watts, or 13 TW. This unit analy-
sis, which Martin Hoffert and I have tried
to popularize, is the basis for what
Dr. Smalley brilliantly adopted as “the ter-
awatt challenge.” That challenge is for
humans to sustainably produce enough
energy to meet that global 13 TW need.
Out of that 13 TW, the United States con-
sumes about 3.2 TW, or about a quarter of
the total. The U.S. National Energy Policy
report7 expresses that amount in quads
(a quadrillion Btu), stating that the U.S.
annual energy consumption is about
99 quads. Recalculating that figure in SI
units, however, yields the same result: an
average burn rate of 3.2 TW. From this
point on, I will not discuss the United
States’ energy concerns in isolation—
although that topic is a vital part of our
national political debate—because our
concerns about energy stem primarily
from our concerns about national security.
Historically, humans have always been
willing to go to war to acquire or defend
natural resources. If, for example, another
country has resources that we need, but
refuses to sell them or grant access to them,
human experience has shown that we may
see this as a clear mandate to challenge
them militarily in order to attain those
resources.
Sources of Current Global Energy
Consumption
Taking a global rather than national per-
spective, I am going to focus on the 13 TW
that are consumed worldwide to run our
planet (see Figure 1a). Eighty-five percent
of that amount is represented by fossil
energy, with oil, gas, and coal  contributing
roughly equal amounts. Hydroelectricity
accounts for a small part, about two-tenths
of a terawatt. The segment of biomass that
is unsustainably burned constitutes 1.2 TW
of our total rate of energy consumption.
However, the total amount of sustainably
burned biomass is part of the total catego-
rized as “renewables” which represents
0.28 TW. Biomass is renewable when
replanting and reforesting of crops are tak-
ing place at a rate commensurate with the
burning of those crops for energy. The heat
produced by nuclear power represents 0.9
TW out of the 13 TW.
It is interesting to note that of the 0.9
TW of power generated by nuclear fission
plants, only 400 GW, or about 30%, is con-
verted into electricity. To put it another
way, that 0.9 TW is the heat content pro-
duced by the nuclear fission process, in
the same way that 2.98 TW is the heat con-
tent of burning all the coal consumed in a
given year. This example dramatically
illustrates the difference between the
amount of primary energy consumed rel-
ative to the amount of secondary energy
delivered to the end user.
Renewable forms of energy represent
2% of our total energy consumption. I
have used a logarithmic scale to put these
various renewable contributions into rela-
tive context (see Figure 1b).
 For biomass—divided somewhat evenly
between electricity, heat, and ethanol—the
total sustainable mean power produced is
only 10−1 TW out of the 13 TW global pri-
mary power consumption. Here, we are
referring only to the sustainably burned
portion of biomass that comes from sources
such as energy farms in Brazil.
 Wind produced one part in 104 of our
energy consumption.
 Solar electric power production, or
solar photovoltaics, is growing rapidly,
but from a small base, providing 10 parts
in a million of our total global primary
power.
 Other renewable resources—solar ther-
mal, geothermal, marine, and tides—are
all small players, representing only frac-
tions of the overall primary energy supply.
At this point, an obvious question
arises: Why does renewable energy not
compose a greater fraction of the current
total energy production? One of the major
reasons is an economic one. Energy is a
commodity, and its use is shaped not only
by policy but also, in large part, by cost.
Consider a comparison of the estimated
costs for electricity production from vari-
ous primary energy sources for the year
2002 (Figure 2a). These estimates are aver-
age three-year fully amortized costs in the
United States, but they are representative
of trends around the world.
Coal, on average, is the least expensive
way to make electricity today, costing
1–4 cents per kWh. The 4 cents incorpo-
rates the cost of capitalizing, building, and
operating the coal-fired plants over their
40-year lifetime, while the 1 cent is the
short-run marginal cost, or the cost of lit-
erally adding more coal to the fire.
Next in line on our scale is electricity
from natural gas, which costs 2.3–5 cents
per kWh. Natural gas was favored in the
United States for some time, when we had
certain SOx and NOx regulations, but gas
has now been replaced by coal as the
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Figure 1. (a) Global consumption of various energy sources (2001). (b) Renewable forms
of energy represented 2% of global energy consumption in 2001.
“I believe that energy, not the dollar, is the currency of the world.
It is the joule that drives every economy and gives people a way
out of poverty.”
favored economical choice for electricity
generation.
Producing electricity from oil costs 6–8
cents per kWh. It is foolish to burn oil at a
fixed site to make electricity, which we did
at one time in the United States. During the
oil crisis of the 1970s, much of the energy
that we conserved from oil resulted not
from conserving vehicle mileage, but from
eliminating oil as a fuel in the electric
power system. Now that we have accom-
plished this, there should be no going back.
Wind, in favorable sites, can produce
electricity for 5–7 cents per kWh. That cost
may seem comparable to the cost of elec-
tricity from coal or gas, but in all fairness,
it does not involve any expenses for stor-
age and is not base-loaded. Wind power
peaks when the wind blows strongly in a
favorable site.
The cost of nuclear electricity genera-
tion at scale, 6–7 cents per kWh, is predi-
cated on the construction of 1000 new
nuclear fission plants. A study at MIT
led by John Deutch and Ernie Moniz8
showed that if 1000 nuclear power plants
were built, the cost of the electricity pro-
duced by them could then probably be
brought down to 6–7 cents per kWh. It
must be added, of course, that the world,
thus far, has built only about 430 such
plants. If you ask the CEOs of electric
utilities in the United States why we
have not permitted a new nuclear power
plant to be built in this country in the
past 30 years, they will not cite a lack of
public acceptance as the prime reason.
Virtually all of them will say that, right
now, cost is the major factor, because
electricity from nuclear power is more
expensive to produce than electricity
from coal or gas.
The most expensive electricity comes
from renewable sources. Solar electricity
(solar photovoltaics) costs 25–50 cents per
kWh to produce, while solar thermal elec-
tricity, in peak sites, can be generated for
10–15 cents per kWh.
There is a conventional wisdom that
says that renewable wind, solar, and
nuclear sources could compete fairly with
fossil fuels for energy (not electricity, high-
value energy) production if the produc-
tion costs of the renewables could be
brought down by only a few cents per
kWh. That is unfortunately not true.
Again, in the photo of the world at night,
the millions of lights shining from earth
represent a part of our electricity usage,
which is in total only 10% of our total
energy consumption. That 10% is high-
value energy, while the 90% of the energy
that runs the rest of our economy is low-
grade energy. That 90% represents the
heat used to make products in factories,
the heat used to heat and cool our build-
ings and homes, and the energy used to
drive our cars.
To assess the true value of electricity
against lower-grade forms of energy, we
will evaluate its cost per joule, expressing
that cost as dollars per gigajoule (see
Figure 2b). In a comparison of the values
of coal, oil, biomass, and electricity, coal is
the least expensive (at about $2/GJ), fol-
lowed by oil, then biomass. Electricity, at
$0.05/kWh, actually costs $14/GJ. At a
nickel per kWh, then, electricity is expen-
sive energy. When electricity is made from
coal, it will be more than three times more
expensive per joule delivered than the cost
of coal, because a coal-fired power plant is
only 30% efficient. In another example,
using $0.05 per kWh of electricity to heat a
house would result in a monthly home
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Today: Production Cost of Electricity
(in the U.S. in 2002)
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Figure 2. (a) Estimated costs for electricity production from various primary energy sources
in the United States (2002), in cents per kilowatt-hour. (b) In a comparison of the values of
coal, oil, biomass, and electricity, coal is the least expensive (at about $2/GJ), followed by
oil, then biomass. Electricity, at $0.05/kWh, actually costs $14/GJ. When electricity is made
from coal, it will be more than three times more expensive per joule delivered than the cost
of coal.
heating bill of about $1000, which is not a
realistic solution even for the developed
world.
For the developing world, the picture is
even grimmer. Because the cost of $14/GJ
electricity is greater by a factor of five than
the cost of $2/GJ for coal, renewable
energy costs would have to decrease by a
factor of 25–30, rather than by a factor of
4–5, in order for them to compete econom-
ically in the total energy picture, as
opposed to the portion of secondary
energy that is consumed as electricity.
Creating viable forms of renewable
energy for developing countries such as
China or India would therefore require
another factor of five to make their
economies run on a fair energy basis.
The Impact of Energy Reserves and
Resources
Some people think this scenario of
global energy consumption will change
naturally. In that view, pure market forces
will raise the price of our existing energy
technology just as our supply of fossil
fuels is nearing depletion, then the curves
will cross at some point in the future and
renewables will become the market
favorites. We can best evaluate that possi-
bility by taking a detailed look at our cur-
rent energy reserves and resources.
“Proven reserves” are the quantities of
fossil energy that the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission allows a company,
with 90% confidence, to book and to tell
its stockholders it has in the ground.
“Resources” are fossil energy supplies
that the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS),
with 50% confidence, estimates are still
left to be discovered in the ground. The
critical factor here is understanding not
just what energy sources we know are
there now, but also what sources are avail-
able for humans to consume on our
planet. That is the resource base.
To determine how long our current
energy supply is likely to last, I will leave
aside economic and geopolitical consider-
ations and focus on a purely geologic esti-
mate of the global energy picture. If you
take the proven reserves and the esti-
mated resource base of the various fossil
fuels—oil, gas, and coal—and divide that
number by the burn rate for each of those
fuels, you can compute approximately
how long each fuel will be available for
energy production. To do this calculation,
I used peer-reviewed numbers for both
the proven reserves and the estimated
resource base, and fuel burn rates for 1998,
for which there are solid consumption
data for each type of fuel. Looking only at
proven reserves, the results—depending
on whether or not you include unconven-
tional resources—show that we have
40–80 years of oil supplies, 60–176 years of
natural gas globally, and more than 200
years of coal, both globally and within the
United States.
Some people use the oil reserves figure
to claim that we are going to run out of oil
in 40 years. To understand why this is not
accurate, it helps to look closely at some of
the challenges faced by oil companies in
finding and extracting oil. If, for example,
the cost of drilling an oil well is $1 million
a day, and only one in every four wells
will be “wet”—that is, will yield oil—it is
not surprising that oil companies allocate
only enough capital to prove out 40 years’
worth of reserves, and then find other
ways to invest their money. Investing in
the discovery of oil 100 years out simply
does not pay because that investment and
asset is evaluated on a net present value
basis, yielding very little immediate profit.
Even more compelling is the fact that we
have had 40 years’ worth of proven
reserves of oil literally since the day after
oil was discovered, and that ratio has
remained stable for the past 100 years.
What really matters is the amount of oil,
along with coal and natural gas, that is
still available in our resource base.
Significantly, we have from 50 to 150 years
of oil resources, with oil discovery going
on continuously. We also have about 200
to 600 years of natural gas and almost
2000 years of coal in our resource base. In
our fossil-fungible world, there are vast
amounts of hydrocarbon energy resources
that can last us for many centuries, if not
millennia. This does not even include the
methane clathrates, off the continental
shelves, which are estimated to exist in
comparable quantities to all of the oil,
coal, and gas on our planet combined.
Even if, at some point, we started to
peak in oil (which is, of course, eventually
inevitable), we have the expertise to get
around that. For example, we already
know technologically how to convert both
natural gas and coal into liquid hydrocar-
bons. Right now, ExxonMobil Corporation
and Shell Oil Company are spending over
$10 billion to develop gas-to-liquid-hydro-
carbon conversion plants. Historically, this
type of conversion has been shown to be a
viable alternative to oil. During World War
II, when Germany was denied oil by the
Allies, the country was able to flip its econ-
omy on a dime and ran by liquefying coal
to run its war machine. Thus, a limited
global supply of one fossil energy source
can be compensated for, in principle, by
the additional consumption of another fos-
sil fuel.
Fossil fuel still remains the cheapest
energy resource available as a commodity
on the world market. Regarding oil, for
example, we have already produced, in
history, about 1 trillion barrels of oil at rel-
atively low per-barrel rates. Extracting the
next trillion barrels from the ground is
estimated to cost around $20 per barrel.
The next trillion barrels could be had for
under $30 per barrel, and the next trillion
barrels for under $40 per barrel. When oil
was only $9 per barrel, people looked at
projections like these and declared that the
age of cheap oil was over, and that things
could only get worse. Today, $40 per bar-
rel looks like a bargain!
From all of these considerations, it is
clear that we have an abundant, inexpen-
sive resource base of fossil energy that is
not going to run out any time soon. The
Stone Age did not end because of a short-
age of stones. Likewise, the Fossil Energy
Age is not going to end any time soon
because we have run out of cheap fossil
energy. Neither then are renewables going
to play a large role in primary power gen-
eration unless or until some technological
breakthrough is achieved, or some exter-
nality is introduced into energy pricing. In
short, the market will not drive us into
using non-fossil forms of energy for a long
time. These are controversial conclusions
to some audiences, but I believe that the
numbers presented here support the con-
clusion analytically.
Energy and Sustainability
Factors that Impact Energy Demand
What I believe is more probable is that
other events and conditions will prevent
us from using all of our fossil energy—
despite its abundance, availability, and
cheapness. What, exactly, might be the
“game-changers” related to energy? Over
100 articles exist on the topic of sustain-
ability, but I will recap just one, published
in 1998 in Nature and authored by Martin
Hoffert et al.9 This article, which summa-
rized work from the 1992 report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC),10 is not really about cli-
mate, but about energy. Even though the
report came out nearly 15 years ago, the
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“There are about six major climate models, all differing from each
other in detail. As scientists and engineers, we know, therefore,
that in detail at least five of them must be wrong.”
data compiled then now still illustrate
dramatically the enormous scale of our
energy challenges.
A major factor is population growth,
which is a key driver for energy demand.
In order to reasonably predict how much
energy will be needed in the future, we
need to know how many humans are
going to be on our planet. This can be esti-
mated by a chart showing data on a loga-
rithmic scale, since population growth
will, in fact, be a key factor in driving
energy demand. The current global popu-
lation is approximately 6 billion, and is
estimated to increase to about 10 billion in
the year 2050, which I will use as the rep-
resentative “out” date for this discussion.
I chose 2050 for two reasons. First,
achieving results in the energy industry is
a much longer-term endeavor than, say,
achieving results in the information tech-
nology business. In IT, for example, you
can build a Web site and only a few years
later become a Google. If you build a coal-
fired power plant, however, it will take
about 40 years to pay itself off and deliver
a reasonable return on investment. The
energy infrastructure that we build in the
next 10 years, therefore, is going to deter-
mine, by and large, what our planet’s
energy mix is going to look like in 2050.
The second reason for choosing 2050 is
that today’s population wants to know
what our planet’s energy picture is going
to look like within a timeframe meaning-
ful to them—the next 30 to 40 years.
Instead of analyzing global energy con-
sumption purely on a per person basis, I
am also going to factor in economic pro-
ductivity, which is strongly correlated to
energy consumption. The U.S. President’s
Council on Economic Advisors, along
with most other policy-making groups,
would first break down energy consump-
tion according to per capita gross domes-
tic product (GDP) growth, which globally
has been about 1.6% per year, on average,
historically. According to the IPCC—and
I believe their extrapolation to be a con -
servative one—in a “business-as-usual”
scenario we can expect the future to be
similar, on average, to what we have expe-
rienced over the past 100 years. Thus, we
can expect to enjoy about 1.6% or so eco-
nomic growth for the next 50 years.
One can debate about whether a sus-
tainable GDP growth rate is 1%, 2%, or
4%. The developed countries believe
about 4% is sustainable, and few, if any,
countries have a policy against economic
growth. Nobody, however, at the time
when these estimates were made, could
have foreseen that China, along with
India, would be growing at 7%–10% per
year. While we can only hope that the
global growth rate will not go negative,
1.6% therefore seems to be a representa-
tively conservative number.
Evaluated by themselves, economic
growth and population growth would
conspire, through the magic of exponen-
tials compounded, to lead unabated to a
tripling of energy demand between now
and 2050. Considered in terms of energy
consumption per unit of GDP, however,
we are actually saving energy, and at a
rate of about 1% per year globally.
Energy consumption in the United
States, as well as in other developed
countries, is declining somewhat more
rapidly. We can accomplish this because
we operate from such a high base that it
is much easier for us, as compared with
developing countries, to implement
energy-saving technologies like compact
fluorescent light bulbs. It is difficult to
save much energy if you are lighting
your home at night with only two can-
dles. Because the developing countries
are not sustaining the same rate of declin-
ing energy consumption per unit of GDP
as the developed ones, the global average
rate of decline is about 1% per year.
Looking at energy demand in terms of
these three separate factors—population
growth, economic growth, and energy
consumption per unit of GDP—is useful
because it builds energy efficiency into
the demand side of the equation. Develop -
ments related to increased energy effi-
ciency—the efforts materials researchers
are putting into creating better fuel cells,
light-emitting-diode–based lighting, solar
thermal technology, and passive insula-
tion for homes—are thus incorporated
into our assumptions about demand
reduction. The 1% per year global demand
reduction can be plotted on a chart to
extrapolate what the average thermal
energy load would be on our planet in
50 years if we kept to this demand reduc-
tion rate (see Figure 3). It would be at
2 kW/person, represented by the horizon-
tal dashed line in the figure. Significantly,
the average recent thermal energy load for
the United States is 10 kW/person. The
2 kW/person figure thus requires that
every country’s average is one-fifth the
current U.S. per person energy demand.
To reach this goal, we would need to
start today to do everything possible—
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Figure 3. Energy consumption versus gross domestic product.
including using 100 mpg cars and zero-
energy homes—to conserve energy.
For calibration, the 2 kW/person aver-
age turns out to be about twice as much as
it takes in energy just to eat. If you convert
a 2000 calorie per day diet into wattage,
that works out to be about 100 W. But, the
energy needed to produce a certain
amount of food—to grow, fertilize, distrib-
ute, and refrigerate it—is 10 to 20 times
greater than the energy embedded in that
amount of food. Thus, 1 kW/person is
required in our highly mechanized
Western society just to eat. Assuming that
the world average energy consumption is
only 2 kW/person (i.e., twice as much as it
takes to eat), twice as much energy will be
needed roughly to meet demand within
50 years. This is in accord with the most
optimistic projections of the World Energy
Assessment and the International Energy
Agency. Some say that demand will go
higher than this.
The 2 kW/person energy need can be
expressed another way, that 28 TW of total
global power will be needed by 2050.
Even though we currently use only 13 TW,
we will be able to make up the difference
by consuming more of our fossil energy,
oil, gas, and coal, of which ample supplies
will be available for centuries. As stated
previously, the availability of fossil energy
is not the problem that is of primary
 concern.
Sustainability Indicators
Our energy problem lies in the effects
caused by the CO2 produced when fossil
fuels are burned. A useful measurement in
studying this problem is the mean carbon
intensity of the energy mix, the amount of
carbon emitted to the atmosphere as CO2,
averaged over our planet, over the energy
mix, during the past century. A more spe-
cific way to express the mean carbon
intensity is how many kilograms of car-
bon are emitted to the atmosphere as CO2
per year per watt of power produced from
fuel. Figure 4a of the mean carbon inten-
sity from 1890 through 2100 (projected)
shows that this figure has been steadily
declining. As we have evolved into an
industrial society, we have used, and then
de-emphasized, a series of fossil fuels.
From wood unsustainably burned in
caves, producing the largest carbon emis-
sions per joule from the source, we have
gone to coal burned in locomotives, pro-
ducing large amounts of CO2 from a car-
bon-rich source. Following coal in carbon
intensity is oil, then natural gas.
Today, we are doing better. Part of our
energy comes from natural gas, or CH4,
which, when burned, produces 1 mole-
cule of CO2 for every 2 molecules of H2O.
Methane is carbon-light in terms of the
carbon emissions per unit of energy
 delivered to the end user. Oil has a chem-
ical formula of about CH2, so it is between
coal and methane for CO2 emissions. The
lines in Figure 4a representing coal, oil,
and gas we can do nothing about, because
they are simply properties of the chemical
stoichiometry and the heats of combus-
tion of coal, oil, and gas. The average, in
1990, is represented by a small circle on
the carbon intensity line. The IPCC pro-
jected, I believe optimistically, that in a
business-as-usual scenario we will con-
tinue along the historical trend of declin-
ing mean carbon intensity, all the way
through to 2050, in terms of adopting a
cleaner-burning energy fuels mix, from a
carbon emissions standpoint.
If we were able to continue this decar-
bonization trend, the projected carbon
intensity in 2050 would be 0.45 kg of car-
bon per watt-year, which is lower than that
of any of the fossil fuels. The only way one
can reach this value of the mean carbon
intensity is through a significant contribu-
Powering the Planet
MRS BULLETIN • VOLUME 32 • OCTOBER 2007 • www/mrs.org/bulletin 813
Carbon Intensity of Energy Mix
M. I. Hoffert et al., Nature, 1998, 395, 881
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Figure 4. (a) Carbon intensity of the energy mix from 1890 through 2100 (projected), i.e.,
kilograms of carbon emitted to the atmosphere as CO2 per year per watt of power
produced from combined sources of fuel. The average in 1990 is shown as an open circle
on the carbon intensity curve. (b) CO2 emissions versus CO2 in the atmosphere, projected
through 2100. See text for discussion.
“As scientists, then, we can say that what humanity decides to do
about energy is an experiment, the biggest experiment that humans
will have ever done.”
tion of carbon-free power to the total
energy mix. In other words, to obtain a
mean carbon intensity below that of an
economy based entirely on natural gas
requires significant amounts of power pro-
duced by carbon-free or carbon-neutral
sources. To the extent that the mix of fossil
fuels used to generate energy is not 100%
natural gas, but also includes roughly
equal parts of oil and coal, even more car-
bon-neutral energy is needed to maintain
the average of the total mix at the 0.45 kg
C/Wyr value.
Let us assume, however, that indeed we
follow this line and that we are able to
decarbonize the mix to better than a pure
natural gas economy within our life -
times. If we know the amount of energy
demanded in every year and the amount
of carbon that we produce from the energy
that we demand every year, then we need
only multiply those two functions together
to get the amount of carbon that will be
emitted into our atmosphere every year
under this scenario. This amount leads to
the top curve in Figure 4b. That curve is
significant, because under this arguably
highly optimistic scenario, the atmos-
pheric concentrations of CO2 still are not
stabilized at any reasonable value. To sta-
bilize the concentrations of CO2 at 350
ppm by 2050 would necessitate reducing
the carbon emissions on our planet to zero
by that date. To hold CO2 concentrations to
450 ppm would still require aggressive
reductions, better than the scenario I just
described. To achieve a limit of even 550
ppm would still involve extremely high
reductions.
We do not know, except through cli-
mate models, what the implications of
driving the atmospheric CO2 concentra-
tions to any of these levels will be. There
are about six major climate models, all dif-
fering from each other in detail. As scien-
tists and engineers, we know, therefore,
that in detail at least five of them must be
wrong. Complicating the matter even fur-
ther, these climate models are based on the
averages of many paths, because of sparse
initial data for the last 100 years of temper-
atures and cloud formations. Earth, how-
ever, is on one path, and nobody knows
which one. If we wait for a climate model
that can exactly predict the climate in
2050, then I will make the only rigorously
true prediction about when we will
exactly be able to do that scientifically—
when we open our doors on New Year’s
Day, January 1, 2050, and look outside.
We do, however, have data from the
past. An excellent collection of informa-
tion about the past is the Vostok Ice Core
data from over 400,000 years, recently
extended in other ice cores to over 600,000
years, showing that CO2 levels have been
in a narrow band of between 200–300
ppm, but not higher. We know from sim-
ple calculations that under the scenario I
described, within our lifetime the atmos-
pheric concentrations of CO2 are going to
be twice as high as they have been in the
last million years, are already higher than
in the past 20 million years, and will prob-
ably be higher than in the last 100 million
years.
We do not know precisely what the
effects of these increased concentrations of
CO2 will be upon our planet, but we do
know what we can see now for ourselves,
with the naked eye. One of the visible
“markers” is that every glacier on earth
but a few is melting. A photo of Upsala
Glacier, the largest glacier in the Southern
Hemisphere, in 1928, compared with a
photo of that same glacier in 2004, shows
that what was originally a field of ice has
now become a lake. In August of 2006, I
visited Alaska to see the Portage Glacier,
taking a boat ride from the visitors’ center
to the glacier. The disturbing fact here is
that the visitors’ center originally was
built at the edge of the glacier, and as late
as 1985, there was no lake.
In Greenland, there are great quantities
of ice. Sea level is predicted to rise by 20
feet if that ice continues to melt. We do not
know for sure that CO2 is the cause of this;
we only know that there is simply one
way to find out.
We know that more than just thermal
management is at issue here because the
pH of the near-surface oceans is chang-
ing—20% of the coral is already bleached.
Many models predict that from half to all
of it will be bleached within our lifetime,
as we acidify the oceans and change their
carbonate equilibrium. Anyone who
wants to see coral in its pristine state
should probably visit coral reefs sooner
rather than later.
No climate model rigorously incorpo-
rates the nonlinear effects of CO2. An
example of these effects is the melting of
the permafrost, which we know is hap-
pening because we can isotopically date
the helium being released. This He has not
been released from the permafrost in at
least 40,000 years. As the ice melts, it
also releases methane and CO2. Enough
methane and CO2 is contained there that,
if the melting process continues, the levels
could go up by a factor of 10. This has
already happened once before, 230 million
years ago in the Permian Era. There was
an isotopically light, massive, quick
release of carbon. CO2 levels then rose by
factors of 10, temperatures spiked by fac-
tors of from 4°C to 8°C, and according to
the fossil record, about 90% of the species
that existed on Earth at the time went
extinct. We do not know that this would
happen again, but we do know that there
is only one way to find out.
Another important fact is that CO2,
unlike ozone, for example, does not have
a natural destruction mechanism. Ozone,
when formed, is then destroyed. CO2,
which is the most oxidized form of C in
our oxidizing atmosphere, equilibrates
with the near-surface oceans and the
 biomass. That process takes about 10 to
30 years, and that is accounted for in the
models I discussed previously that
showed how much CO2 will be emitted
versus how much will remain in the
atmosphere. CO2 has great staying power
because it has to move from the near-
 surface ocean to the deep ocean to be
depleted from the air. At the levels of
CO2 that we are emitting today, our best
knowledge says that the equilibration
time of mixing, from the near surface
to the deep ocean, will take from 500 to
5,000 years. A good number for the CO2
lifetime is estimated to be about 3,000
years. As scientists, then, we can say that
what humanity decides to do about
energy is an experiment, the biggest
experiment that humans will have ever
done. Unless someone finds a technically
credible, cost-effective way to get rid of
CO2, it is an experiment whose effects,
whatever they may be, will be with us for
a time scale comparable to modern
human history.
Carbon-Free Energy Needs
Assuming that we continue to use
roughly equal amounts of oil, coal, and
gas, the exact breakdown of how much
carbon-free power would be needed in
2050 to meet the business-as-usual 0.45 kg
of C/Wyr carbon mean intensity value
is about 10 TW. Stabilizing the atmosphere
at 550 ppm of CO2, which is twice the pre-
anthropogenic levels, under the demand-
reduction scenario I described, would
require more than 10 TW. To hold CO2
emissions to 450 ppm and meet demand
would require an even greater amount of
carbon-neutral power. By any reasonable
measure, to stabilize CO2 concentrations
at reasonable levels, we need to make
as much energy from carbon-neutral
sources, within our lifetimes, as all of the
oil, coal, gas, and nuclear power we pro-
duce today combined.
It becomes obvious, then, that waiting
50 years for scenarios to play out is an
issue because, in the meantime, CO2 will
have accumulated in our atmosphere to a
level no human has ever experienced and,
given the long lifetime of CO2, it will
remain there for generations to come. This
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outcome, according to Martin Hoffert,
underscores the pitfalls of the “wait-and-
see” solution, which involves waiting for
market forces to take over.
On the other hand, where can 10 or 20
trillion watts of carbon-free power be
found? The physics of our planet dictates
that 10 TW of carbon-free energy can be
obtained only from certain primary
sources, three to be exact: nuclear power,
carbon sequestration, and renewable car-
bon-neutral energy sources.
Nuclear Power. The only existing
 carbon-free technology that can scale to
the 10 TW or greater level is nuclear fis-
sion, our first possibility. I am not person-
ally for or against nuclear power, but
I believe we should understand what its
ramifications would be before making
decisions about it, especially since it will
be the only source to fall back on if we
decide not to do anything else.
One challenge presented by nuclear fis-
sion—one that you seldom hear about in
the press—is that its capacity to generate
enough power to meet our needs is
dwarfed by the sheer magnitude of our
carbon-free energy requirements. The
“just build a few nuclear power plants”
solution falls completely short. Given the
limits at which structural materials can be
developed to handle the heat and radia-
tion flux in a fission reactor and make it
viable commercially for a 50-year lifetime,
safe reactor designs are rated at 1 GW of
electricity output. Since the world needs
10 TW, at minimum, 10,000 such reactors
would need to be built. In other words, we
would need to build a new nuclear power
plant somewhere in the world every other
day, continuously, for the next 50 straight
years. Even building 1000 nuclear plants
at that rate would not begin to solve the
problem, because 95% of the world’s
energy needs would still be unmet.
Furthermore, if demand cannot be
reduced to the 2 kW/person level we dis-
cussed earlier, even more nuclear plants
would have to be built merely to hold the
atmospheric CO2 concentration at double
what any human has ever experienced on
our planet.
Complicating this picture is the avail-
ability of nuclear reactor fuel. The proven
reserves and the resource base of all terres-
trial uranium combined would be enough
to provide only 10 years of operation for
the 10,000 necessary nuclear power plants
under once-through operations. Uranium
could be mined from seawater, but the
equivalent of 3,000 Niagara Falls would
be needed, running constantly, to mine
uranium, which is very dilute in sea water
(nanomolar levels) at this scale. One solu-
tion might be to develop a uranium– -
thorium cycle, but that has not yet been
proven technically at scale. Another solu-
tion is to use plutonium and reprocessing,
and enough plutonium and reprocessing
fuel exist to make this possible.
Plutonium, then, is the only possible fuel
solution now available, when combined
with the nuclear plant-building schedule
of a plant every other day for the next 50
years. One clearly would need to evaluate
the implications of building thousands of
plutonium-based power plants before
pursuing this option seriously.
Carbon Sequestration. Another
approach to producing carbon-free power
is to sequester the CO2. In this process,
CO2 would be captured when it is emitted
from a power plant, and then sequestered
through burial in the deep ocean or in geo-
logical reservoirs, or perhaps through con-
version to carbonates. Burial of gigatons
per year of CO2 in the deep ocean has
largely been discredited because it would
eventually change the pH of the ocean,
thereby inducing potentially radical eco-
logical changes in the biosphere.
Sequestration in geologic reservoirs—oil
and gas reservoirs and aquifers—is much
more promising, provided that the reser-
voirs will remain intact. The collective leak
rates of the reservoirs must be significantly
lower than 1%, sustained over a century-to-
millennium-type time scale. Otherwise,
after 50 to 100 years of sequestration, the
yearly emissions will be comparable to the
emission levels that were supposed to be
mitigated in the first place. CO2 geysers can
form naturally and have been known to
harm life when the CO2 migrates out.
Furthermore, because every underground
geologic aquifer is different, being able to
verify that billions of tons of CO2 could be
sequestered in one or two particular
aquifers for centuries to millennia at a 0.1%
leak level would not be sufficient. We
would need to perform such verification
for every one of the hundreds or thousands
of places that sequestration took place.
A significant fraction of the existing
 fossil-derived power plants could be retro-
fitted to allow for sequestration if it worked
on the needed scale. An equally significant
fraction, however, are too remote from the
location of suitable geologic reservoirs,
requiring that either the CO2 would have to
be pumped long distances or entirely new
plants would have to be suitably sited and
constructed. In addition, significant addi-
tional costs would be incurred in convert-
ing the entire energy distribution system to
either electricity or to the required non-
 carbon-containing fuel, presumably H2.
From a CO2 emission viewpoint, clean coal
is not clean at all unless the carbon can be
safely buried.
Sequestration, then, should definitely be
explored as an option, but it is far from
clear that it will technically work at scale, or
what its actual overall energy system cost
would be. A lot of research is still needed in
modeling materials and testing interactions
of CO2 in the subsurface in order to under-
stand whether this will technically work.
The United States is building a plant called
FutureGen, scheduled to go online in 2012,
that is geared to demonstrate that CO2 can
be buried. The U.S. Department of Energy
is doing work on carbon sequestration,
with the goal of creating 1 gigaton of stor-
age by 2025 and 4 gigatons total by 2050.
Since the United States’ annual carbon
emissions are 1.5 gigaton per year, the total
DOE goal for 50 years from now is com-
mensurate with a few years’ worth of cur-
rent emissions. There is clearly a large
mismatch between our goals and what
would be needed to solve this problem, a
gap that we need to close quickly.
Renewable Carbon-Neutral Energy
Sources. Leaving aside nuclear fission
and clean coal, the other approach to pro-
ducing carbon-neutral power is to use
 carbon-neutral renewables, of which there
are six often-mentioned sources: hydro-
electric, geothermal, oceans/tides, winds,
biomass, and solar.
Hydroelectricity is a model renewable
energy resource. It is relatively cheap,
fairly abundant, and relatively benign. The
total hydrological energy potential of the
planet, however, including the energy in
the water flow from every river, lake, and
stream, amounts to a rate of approximately
4.6 TW. Since it is not techni cally practical
to build dams on every small creek, all of
that power cannot be extracted. The
amount of technically feasible hydroelec-
tric power globally has been estimated to
be about 1.5 TW. The amount of economi-
cally feasible hydro is only about 0.9 TW,
and 0.6 TW capacity of that has already
been installed. While hydroelectricity is an
attractive renewable resource that should
continue to be exploited wherever possi-
ble, it will not make a significant contri -
bution toward our 10–20 TW global
carbon-free energy requirement in the
mid-21st century.
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“Producing 2 TW of wind power would require the operation of
2 million state-of-the-art wind turbines, starting today.”
In a few places on Earth, we are able to
take advantage of geothermal energy
directly, using steam as it comes up out of
the ground to run turbines and produce
electricity. In most places, however, it is
necessary to exploit the 200-degree thermal
gradient of the Earth by going down about
10 km, injecting cold water into a well, and
having the hot dry rock heat it up and con-
vert it to steam for running a turbine.
The Earth contains an enormous
amount of heat, which can be located on
geothermal maps. The amount of heat,
however, that can be sustainably used is
equal to the total geothermal heat flux at
the Earth’s surface, which is 57 mW/m2
over land. Multiplying that figure by the
area of all of the land on Earth results in
11.6 TW of sustainable global heat energy.
Of course, there is a small problem involv-
ing the second law of thermodynamics,
which will prevent us from getting 100%
efficient heat engines at a low temperature
difference, that will practically let us
extract much less than a few terawatts sus-
tainably.
In terms of oceanic and tidal energy, all
the energy in all the currents, all the tides,
and all the waves on our planet combined
falls far short of the 10–20 TW needed.
Wind could be an important player in
producing our total carbon-free energy
mix, but it has constraints. The National
Renewable Energy Laboratory did a
study11 in the 1990s showing that if wind-
mills are sited at 4%–5% spacing (which is
about their optimal spacing for not
obscuring each other), and nothing is
excluded other than environmentally sen-
sitive lands or urban areas, a significant
amount of electricity could be produced.
For example, if windmills were deployed
in all of the suitable sites in all of North
Dakota, 36% of U.S. domestic electricity
production for the year 1990 could be pro-
duced. That 36% figure, however, repre-
sents only the fraction of the 1990
electricity consumption of the United
States, 0.3–0.4 TW, which constitutes
about only 10% of our total primary
energy consumption, which is now 3 TW.
On a global scale, adding all of the
 marginal-to-high potential wind areas in
the world, and considering practical site
constraints, windmills could produce a
total of 2–4 TW of electricity. The offshore
electrical power potential of wind is
greater than 2–4 TW, but transmitting sig-
nificant amounts of power from offshore
installations to the land-based regions that
need it would be a major problem. In
addition, realistically the 2–4 TW of global
wind power is an overestimate, because it
is based on point-source measurements.
As the wind travels through windmill
installations, its initial energy is depleted
to the point where, far into an installation
the length of, say the entire state of North
Dakota, very little wind energy would
remain to turn the turbines and produce
power. Multiplying the point-source wind
energy potential values by arbitrarily
large areas, therefore, produces skewed
estimates. Producing 2 TW of wind power
would require the operation of 2 million
state-of-the-art wind turbines, starting
today. Wind energy could be marginally
material, providing perhaps approxi-
mately 10% of our total energy needs, if
used exhaustively on suitable land around
the globe.
Although biomass is attracting a lot of
attention today as a possible carbon-neu-
tral energy source, it is fundamentally
inefficient. Plants using photosynthesis
store less than 1% of the total incident
energy they receive from sunlight, under
optimal growing conditions, averaged
over the year. In addition, to prevent
oxidative damage, photosynthesis shuts
itself down at higher light intensities.
Those two things conspire to make even
the fastest growing plant, on a yearly
average over large areas, store only 0.3%
of the energy hitting it from the sun, rel-
ative to the amount of insolation (incom-
ing solar radiation) involved. The result
is that incredibly large areas of land
would be needed to provide the 20 TW
of total energy we need: 30% of the total
land on Earth would have to be covered
with energy farms devoted solely to pro-
ducing biomass to meet the carbon-neu-
tral energy demand requirements.
A good way to calibrate the area
demands is from the bottom up, starting
with the fact that not all of that 30% of
needed land can support crops. Begin,
then, with all the rain-fed cultivatable
land on Earth, figure how much of that is
currently used for food production,
increase that amount by about 50% to
meet estimated 2050 food production
needs, and then allocate all the remaining
cultivatable land for biomass production.
Assuming that all of the rain-fed cultivat-
able land not required for food was func-
tioning as an energy farm—with no need
for any energy coming in or going out—
the result would be about 5 TW of power.
One way to increase this energy output
would be to genetically modify the plants
used on energy farms, making them
absorb more energy from the sun and
grow more quickly. After some improve-
ments in growth rates, however, by a fac-
tor of two or so, plants will run out of CO2
from the atmosphere to use, due to mass-
flux limitation, and will not be able to
grow much faster.
The above output of 5 TW assumes that
the net energy return from biomass farms
is equal to the gross energy production,
with minimal energy inputs. That result
remains only a best-case scenario. It is well
known, for example, that the corn-to-
ethanol conversion is not energy-efficient.
The numbers are simple: in 2006 in the
U.S., 20% of the corn crop provided 2% of
our transportation fuel. And it used
almost as much energy input, in the form
of coal, as the energy it produced. The
challenge here for materials science is how
to convert nature’s version of coal, ligno-
cellulose, into something that humans can
use as an energy source. A cellulose-to-
ethanol conversion cycle, for example,
could be accompanied by the develop-
ment of a fuel cell that would utilize the
ethanol efficiently. Biomass could be a sig-
nificant contributor to the overall carbon-
neutral power requirements, but it cannot
be relied on alone to meet the estimated
demand.
The last renewable energy resource to
consider is solar energy. The sun is simply
the champion of all energy sources. The
sun provides Earth with 120,000 TW. To
put that another way, more energy from
the sun hits the earth in one hour than all
of the energy consumed on our planet in
an entire year. When talking about solar
energy, I like to cite what I call the “Willie
Sutton principle” of materials science and
energy. Willie Sutton was a bank robber
who robbed many banks and managed to
elude the law for years before he was
finally caught. When asked why he
robbed banks, he replied, “Because that’s
where the money is.” If Sutton were pre-
sented with our energy problem, he
would obviously say that we should use
the sun because, quite simply, that’s where
the energy is. Solar energy is, in fact, the
only renewable resource that has enough
terrestrial energy potential to satisfy
alone, with room to spare, the 10–20 TW
carbon-free supply constraint in 2050. No
other source comes even close.
The actual land area required to pro-
duce 3 TW of carbon-free power from
solar energy can be represented as a single
box superimposed on a map of the United
States (see Figure 5). This map, which is
on my Web site, has been used in many
venues—including Dr. Smalley’s presen-
tations—to demonstrate solar energy
requirements. The box shows the amount
of land that would be required for a solar
energy “farm” operating at 10% efficiency,
at a representative mid-latitude, to supply
3 TW of power. In reality, the solar energy
sites would be widely distributed, but the
area represented would still cover 1.7% of
U.S. land, comparable to the land devoted
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to the nation’s numbered highways. From
a global perspective, six 3.3 TW boxes
would be needed to represent the needed
amount of land. This is, by no means, a
small area or a small project.
One possibility would be to use solar
panels to generate electricity. Since putting
a 10% efficient solar energy conversion
unit on every U.S. home rooftop would
generate only 0.25 TW, it becomes obvious
that our global 10–20 TW requirement can-
not be met by covering everyone’s house
with solar panels. In fact, to meet a 3 TW
goal, the U.S. would have to install about a
half-million typically sized (2 kW peak
power) solar roof systems every day, con-
tinuously from now until 2050.1
Even if widespread use of solar tech-
nology were possible, the cost would cur-
rently be prohibitive. Science, however,
while it cannot fix the fact that there sim-
ply is not enough practically available
geothermal energy or enough wind
energy to solve our energy problems, can
develop ways to lower the cost of solar
energy products. Of course, a lot of work
remains to be done for truly cost-effective
solar to become a reality. The amount of
energy available from the sun is a con-
stant. If 10% of that energy is extracted as
solar power, how much product energy
can be sold to customers? That concept
could be charted as the cost in U.S. dollars
per square meter of photovoltaic technol-
ogy at various efficiency percentages. If it
costs $300 to install 1 m2, then another
equal amount for the balance of systems,
that will set the amount that must be
charged to customers in order for solar
energy providers to break even.
Amortizing that amount results in a cost
of $0.25 to $0.35 per kWh for solar tech-
nology that is about 10%–20% efficient.
Lowering the price to pennies per kWh
would not be possible solely by improv-
ing efficiency. The cost must be lowered
dramatically, to a range within
$10–$100/m2, probably closer to $10/m2,
to provide cost-effective energy, not just
cost-effective peak energy. As a compari-
son, the cost of house paint now at a typ-
ical building supply store is $1/m2. The
cost of the average carpet is $10/m2. Solar
technology, in whatever forms it might
take, would have to cost not much more
than painting a house or buying carpet.
My colleague, Harry Atwater, phrases the
problem this way: “Do not think ‘silicon
chip,’ think ‘potato chip.’”
Ironically, though, even if solar cells
were cost-free, the problem of producing
enough carbon-free power to satisfy our
energy needs by 2050 would still not be
solved. Sunlight is intermittent, but our
collective energy needs are continuous.
The sun can readily be a peak-generating
power source, only at certain segments of
the day, and on sunny days. And impor-
tantly, solar power produces electricity,
and there is no viable cost-effective way to
store massive quantities of electricity. So
parallel challenges in storage still exist
and remain unsolved today.
Energy Solutions for the Future
Other options exist that could make
solar energy a reasonable way to fulfill the
mismatch between energy supply and
demand, should the CO2-based environ-
mental constraints come into play. From a
cost standpoint, the least expensive way
to store solar-produced electricity would
be to pump water uphill. That method
works well when you are emptying a
reservoir in the summer and filling it in
the winter. To buffer the day/night cycle
would require filling up every reservoir
every day and emptying them every
night. To see this, the energy density in a
kilogram of gasoline is 45 MJ, whereas
that in a kilogram of water at a height of
100 m is 1 kJ. So for every gallon of gaso-
line that we use, storing that same amount
of energy in pumped water requires mov-
ing uphill by 100 m more than 50,000 gal-
lons of water!
Current energy storage, in fact, is
accomplished not by kinetic- to potential-
energy conversion, but by storing energy
in chemical bonds. We get most of our
energy not from making electricity, but
from storing and dispatching energy in the
form of chemical fuels, which by far are the
most cost-effective stored energy sources.
Assuming that biomass could be produced
in sufficient quantities, for example, the
best way to extract energy from it would
be to refine it, make biodiesel, ethanol, or
other liquid fuels, and consume that again,
in a carbon-neutral cycle. Similarly, the
best way to manage supplies of electricity
would be to sell them when they are avail-
able, as opposed to holding on to the elec-
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Figure 5. The red square shows the amount of land needed for a solar energy farm
operating at 10% efficiency to match the 3 TW of power currently consumed in the United
States.
“. . . in 2006 in the U.S., 20% of the corn crop provided 2% of our
transportation fuel. And it used almost as much energy input, in
the form of coal, as the energy it produced. The challenge here for
materials science is how to convert nature’s version of coal, ligno-
cellulose, into something that humans can use as an energy
source.”
tricity. The key missing link in solar power
utilization, then, is a way to capture,
 convert, and cost-effectively store the
energy from the sun.
At present, there are three technology
approaches to producing a “black box” for
the conversion of sunlight to stored
energy (see Figure 6). One method, photo-
voltaics, can be very efficient but has a
high cost per watt of electricity produced.
Biomass produced through photosynthe-
sis is another method. Since photosyn -
thesis is relatively inefficient, biomass
farms require extremely large areas per
unit of output energy produced. A third
approach is the use of semiconductor/
liquid junctions, which is an active area of
research in my group at the California
Institute of Technology, as well as in oth-
ers around the world. Each approach has
its own advantages and issues to be dealt
with.
The efficiency of photovoltaic devices is
increasing, but the industry is still explor-
ing different technologies on a cost per
watt basis. The materials cost dominates
in energy conversion applications because
installed capacity scales linearly with the
area of the device. Put simply, one needs
to pay the price to produce more material
to cover larger areas. The net result is that
one can ride anywhere on this cost/
efficiency tradeoff, but nevertheless ends
up with the same figure of merit, within a
factor of 20%.
Inexpensive materials do not produce
very efficient photovoltaics, while the
expensive materials produce efficient
solar cells, with the result that the cost per
watt installed of both systems is about the
same, to within a factor of 20%–30%. The
photovoltaic materials now available basi-
cally all suffer from the same fundamental
physical limitation, that the large-grain
materials (the pure materials) that have
the long lifetime necessary for making
efficient solar cells are costly to produce.
Using cheap materials, which have a small
grain size, results in inefficient solar cells,
because the grain boundaries act as
recombination sites.
A similar tradeoff is found for organic
(“plastic”) photovoltaics. If pure inorganic
single-crystal materials like silicon and
GaAs are replaced with much cheaper
organic materials, which are inherently
disordered, the cheaper materials lie on
the same cost per watt curve. The result-
ing cells are cheaper, but less efficient.
This does not have to be the case, how-
ever. A cogent argument can be made that,
in order to bring this technology down by
the needed factors to be competitive in
cost with other sources of primary stored
energy, we need to employ disruptive
technologies that are very different than
the technology curve that is being devel-
oped now. From a physics point of view,
there are at least two approaches that have
the potential to provide such a technology
solution.
One approach would be to utilize
chemical methods to “fool” inexpensive
materials into performing as if they were
expensive single crystals, with no cost
involved to actually grow large, single
crystals. Basically, all common solar cell
designs are constrained to have planar
junctions, so as to have a certain thickness
needed to absorb all the sunlight. The
material then has to be pure enough to let
those excited states move to the planar
contacts, otherwise they will recombine
and generate heat. On the other hand, if
we were to use particles of inorganic
materials, the grain boundaries would
serve as sources of carrier recombination
and cheap materials would not work very
well. It remains for researchers, therefore,
to find a way to passivate the surface
atoms of these particles, “fool” them into
thinking they are chemically bonded like
the atoms in the bulk, and get electrons to
hop from particle to particle. Indeed, dye-
sensitized TiO2-based solar cells work
because the electrons do hop from particle
to particle. This method is the basis for
work being done by scientists in my
group, and in others, to passivate small-
grain Si particles to make a binder that
allows electricity to flow right through the
“stepping stones” while fooling the sur-
face atoms.
The other approach is to relax the phys-
ical constraint and produce so-called inter-
penetrating networks. To do this, we will
relax the usual constraint in which the
 carriers must exist long enough in their
excited states to traverse the entire dis-
tance of the cell. A way to do this is to
make structures that look like nature’s ver-
sion of grass, but on the nanometer scale,
obtaining long absorption depths through
rods, but very short collection distances,
by moving carriers sideways and letting
them be collected over short distances, in
an orthogonal direction to where they are
absorbed (see Figure 7). This method for
getting off of the existing cost per watt
curve, which my research group is now
working on, was pioneered by, among oth-
ers, Michael McGehee, the 2007 MRS
Outstanding Young Investigator.12
Both of these photovoltaics approaches
are emerging technologies, and neither of
them is economically or technologically
viable today. They do, however, seem like
feasible solutions in the long run. In the
end, whatever approaches are used must
be almost as inexpensive as painting the
house, as engineered as making layers of
film, and as mass-producible as both of
the previously mentioned technologies.
Even if solar electricity could be suc-
cessfully stored, would we be living in the
“solar hydrogen economy?” We could
track the sun every day using the most
cost-effective method, a solar thermal con-
centrated two-axis parabolic dish. The
dish would utilize a thermal working
fluid, a sterling engine or, in the example
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Figure 6. Three technology approaches for converting sunlight to stored energy.
here, a high-efficiency multijunction con-
centrator cell. These dishes can be 30%
efficient, using solar energy to produce
electricity that would go into an electroly-
sis unit, which, however, would need to
contain huge amounts of platinum. Every
day the electrolyzer would fill a tank with
H2. The problem is that, to produce the
needed minimum of 10 TW of carbon-free
power, one of these structures would have
to be built every second for the next 50
years. The world’s supply of steel or alu-
minum would be needed just to build the
structures. This technology would not
scale, even in a limited way, as currently
practiced, to our 10–20 TW needs.
The following process, however, might
provide a workable alternative. Instead of
putting fuel in a fuel cell across a mem-
brane, sunlight could be used as the
energy source across that photoactive
membrane. Instead of making electricity
and electrons through wires, the incipient
electricity would be used to make and
break chemical bonds just as nature does
in photosynthesis, thereby both captur-
ing/converting and storing the energy for
later dispatch and delivery.
That is something a solar cell by itself
now simply cannot do, because we cur-
rently do not have good catalysts for mak-
ing fuel directly from sunlight, with no
wires. Nature has such catalysts, however,
utilizing in hydrogenases, for example, Fe,
a cheap metal. Nature’s catalysts are not
poisoned by CO and S, as platinum fuel
cell catalysts are, because they have CO
and S in the molecule. Scientists have just
recently learned the structure of these cat-
alysts from x-ray crystallography. Some
chemists are extracting these enzymes and
trying to build models that are both
inspired by, and mimetic of, the natural
catalytic process. Instead of using the
incipient electricity to make H2 or fix CO2,
they are using that energy to make better
fuels directly. An example of such a fuel
would be methanol, a liquid fuel pro-
duced from abundant raw materials. We
do not know how to efficiently make O2
from water, except in nature in the Mn site
of the oxygen-evolving complex of photo-
system II. Another challenge for materials
scientists is to develop catalysts that make
O2 from H2O at low overpotentials,
because if this cannot be done, it is impos-
sible to make a useful, scalable fuel, no
matter what is done on the reducing side
of the chemical transformation.
A Vision for an Energy Program
The greatest energy challenge facing
researchers now is, of course, scale. As
time goes on, we will need increasing
amounts of energy. There has never been a
year in which we as a planet have used
significantly less energy than the year
before. Even if energy use were held con-
stant, in the face of population and eco-
nomic growth, that would just take a
triangularly increasing ramp, and make it
a constant function. Because CO2 emis-
sions, however, are cumulative, the day
when our CO2 emission levels produced
550 ppm of CO2 would merely be pushed
back from 2050 to around 2065. We will
not be able to buy ourselves out of this
problem even by holding demand close to
where it is now. The case, therefore, for
producing significant, if not daunting,
amounts of carbon-neutral power is either
plausible or imperative, depending on
how much risk we, as a society, are willing
to take. This is an experiment at which
we will have only one chance. If we do not
do this experiment, we will never know
what we missed, and if we do, we will
never know if we could have stopped it
instead.
Any realistic energy program would
start with energy efficiency, because sav-
ing energy costs much less than making
energy. Because of all the inefficiencies in
the energy supply chain, for every 1 J of
energy that is saved at the end, 4–5 J is
avoided from being produced. To the
extent that the energy demand reduction
requirement is not met, the supply-side
problem becomes that much harder. In
addition to saving money, energy effi-
ciency is necessary for our security, both
national and environmental, because the
less energy used, the less CO2 emitted.
Any realistic energy program will be
built on a cornerstone that combines tech-
nology and policy. To put in place the
mechanisms necessary to conserve energy
usage, drastically reduce emissions, and
conduct research on clean sources of
energy production, there needs to be agree-
ment about the urgency of the problem and
how it might be addressed. But energy effi-
ciency can go only so far. We will still have
to make enormous amounts of clean
energy. No amount of saving energy ever
turned on a light bulb or put food on some-
one’s table. We need to both save as much
energy as we now make, and make as
much clean energy as all the energy we
now use, to meet a doubling or more of
demand and drastically cut emissions of
CO2 as well. In considering solutions to our
energy supply problems, three “big cards”
remain to be played: (1) technically prove
that carbon sequestration works at scale; (2)
create an enormous amount of nuclear
power from plutonium; and/or (3) find a
way to cheaply capture, convert, and store
the energy from the sun, so that it can be
used wherever it is supplied, and when-
ever it is demanded.
Conclusions
Thus far, I have presented only peer-
reviewed technical numbers. I have not
ventured into the realm of policy. Before I
close, however, I will discuss one critical
policy question: what is the true cost/ben-
efit analysis for developing clean energy
sources? This issue rests on two divergent
views: one, that we cannot afford to invest
massive amounts in clean energy, and
two, that we cannot afford not to do it.
Advocates of the former view believe that
engaging in large-scale energy develop-
ments will ruin our economy. Obviously,
switching from an existing mature infra-
structure to a new one will cost a tremen-
dous amount of money, like any major
project would. The real issue here is how
much the project is worth in terms of
future security, both energy security and
environmental security.
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Figure 7. Nanotechnology-based solar cell design.
“Solar technology, in whatever forms it might take, would have to
cost not much more than painting a house or buying carpet.”
Advocates of developing carbon-free
energy alternatives believe that this is a
project at which we cannot afford to fail
because there is only one chance to get it
right. For them, the question is whether or
not, if the project went ahead, it could be
completed in the time we have remaining.
Because CO2 is extremely long-lived, there
are not actually 50 years left to deal with the
problem. To put this in perspective, con-
sider the following comparisons. If we do
not build the next “nano-widget,” the
world is going to stay the same over the
next 50 years—it will not be better, perhaps,
but it will not be worse, either. Even if we
do not develop a cure for cancer in 50 years,
the world is going to stay basically the
same, in spite of the tragedy caused by that
disease. If we do not fix our energy problem
within the next 20 years, however, we can,
as scientists, say with absolute certainty that
the world will simply not be the same, and
that it will change in a way that, to our best
knowledge, will affect life on our planet for
the next 3,000 years. What this change will
be, we do not precisely know. That is a risk
management question. We simply know
that no human will ever have experienced
what we will within those 50 years, and the
unmitigated results will last for a time scale
comparable to modern human history.
If, on the other hand, we decided to do
something about our energy problem, I am
fairly optimistic we could succeed. As I
have outlined, there are no new principles
at play here. This challenge is not like try-
ing to figure out how to build an atomic
bomb, when we did not know the physics
of bomb-building in the first place—which
was the situation at the start of the
Manhattan Project. We know how to build
solar cells; they have a 30-year warranty.
We have an existence proof with photo-
synthesis. We know the components of
how to capture and store sunlight. We sim-
ply do not yet know how to make these
processes cost-effective, over this scale.
Here, our funding priorities also come
into the picture. In the United States, we
spend $28 billion on health, but only
about $28 million on basic solar research.
Currently, we spend more money buying
gas at the pump in one hour than we
spend funding basic solar research in our
country over an entire year. Yet, in that
same hour, more energy from the sun is
hitting the Earth than all of the energy
consumed on our planet in that year. The
same cannot be said of any other energy
source. On the other hand, we need to
explore all credible energy options that we
believe could work at scale because we do
not know which ones will work yet. In the
end, we will need a mix of energy sources
to meet the 10–20 TW demand, and we
should be doing all we can to see that it
works and works at scale, now and in the
future.
We have established that, as time goes
on, we are going to require energy and we
are going to require it in increasing
amounts. I can say with confidence there-
fore, as Dr. Smalley did, that energy is the
biggest scientific and technological prob-
lem facing our planet in the next 50
years.13 Clearly, the Materials Research
Society is going to play a major role, if
there is one to be played, in developing
the technology that will enable us to dras-
tically reduce the amount of carbon emis-
sions to our atmosphere, while accessing
enough clean energy to run the world.
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